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Market-driven creativity with and without IPRs
by
Danny Quah
1 Introduction
While many aspects of culture admit interesting subtleties in their
economic analysis, none seems more crucially so than the ﬁnanc-
ing of creative activity. How should cultural creativity be rewarded?
What role does culture play in a modern knowledge-driven economy?
Does culture generate identiﬁable economic externalities? What value
should cultural goods and innovation attract? What intellectual
property (IP) systems eﬃciently support creative cultural activity?
It is these questions on creativity, reward, and value that this pa-
per analyzes. This paper takes the perspective that what drives cre-
ativity is economic reward, but the nature and eﬀects of appropriate
rewards are subtle. The paper exploits how related issues have long
appeared in the problem of ﬁnancing scientiﬁc research. Creativity
matters in both cultural and scientiﬁc activity.
It might be, of course, that some agents in culture and science are
creative because they are driven by concerns other than those that
economics traditionally identiﬁes. But scientiﬁc and cultural progress
cannot rely on just those individuals, and the great proportion of work
in both spheres is routine—not driven by genius—and motivated by
the same calculations as any other economic activity.
This paper studies optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs)—
IP protection durations—in a dynamic representative-agent perfect-
foresight economy with multiple intellectual assets. The beneﬁt from
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doing this is that welfare analysis is no longer ad hoc, but can be
treated in an integrated unambiguous way. The paper shows how
conventionally-used but ad hoc partial equilibrium normative anal-
ysis can be misleading in general equilibrium. It compares socially
eﬃcient outcomes with those achievable using markets and optimal
IPR policies. Thus, the paper addresses whether markets and IPRs
produce too much or too little creativity and innovation, relative to
what is socially optimal.
The organizing principle used throughout the paper is dynamic
equilibrium pricing of intellectual assets. In this, the current pa-
per follows Boldrin and Levine (2002) and diﬀers from the approach
used in evaluating R&D taken by, among others, Jones and Williams
(2000).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
brieﬂy describes issues from an extant literature that might be use-
fully transferred to a discussion of culture and creativity. Section
3 develops the model and characterizes (in Prop. 3.3) market-based
intellectual asset valuation under speciﬁc IPR regimes, conditional
on those assets existing. Section 4 considers how intellectual assets
are created—i.e., how innovation occurs—using optimal IP regimes
and markets. It compares outcomes under alternative deﬁnitions
of social eﬃciency. In general, IP regimes and markets might pro-
duce more or less creativity than a command optimum, depending
on the shape of the consumer’s utility function and the dynamic
technology—condition (13) in Prop. 4.2. Section 5 describes recent
work using this same framework on markets-based innovation with-
out the contrivance of IP protection. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes. All
proofs have been placed in the Technical Appendix section 7.
2 Issues
While scientiﬁc and cultural innovation must be driven by the same
economic incentives as the manufacturing of any other kind of eco-
nomic goods, at the same time, something is diﬀerent in culture
and science. It is that something (or one of a number of diﬀerent
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somethings) from which this paper begins. An important subclass
of cultural products share together with the products of scientiﬁc in-
novation (i.e., scientiﬁc knowledge) the same peculiar properties for
economic analysis. Both scientiﬁc knowledge and those cultural goods
are, in a useful idealization, nonrival, aspatial, and initially discrete.
A good is nonrival when its use by one agent does not degrade its
usefulness to a yet diﬀerent agent. Thus, ideas, mathematical theo-
rems, videogames, engineering blueprints, computer software, cookery
recipes, the decimal expansion of π, gene sequences, and so on are
nonrival. By contrast, food is distinctly rival: consumption renders
it immediately no longer existent.
A good is aspatial when its extent is not localized to a physical
spatial neighborhood. Thus, all the examples of nonrivalry mentioned
previously, including perhaps more vividly rich media ﬁlestreams—
sounds and images—on an Internet server, are all also aspatial.1
In the analysis below a third deﬁning characteristic, initial dis-
creteness, matters as well. Cultural goods and scientiﬁc knowledge,
when instantiated, are created to some ﬁxed, discrete quantity—
usually taken to be 1, as there is then one copy of the item. Over time,
more copies can be made, but the instantiation quantity is always a
given.
For compactness I will refer to all such products as cultural goods,
knowledge products, or intellectual assets—even if, for instance, a
Spice Girls MP3 ﬁle might be viewed as not high culture, knowledge-
intensive, nor particularly intellectual. What matters for economic
analysis is only their nonrival, aspatial, initially discrete nature.
Knowledge products, in general, are important for at least three
reasons: First, in the endogenous growth formulations of Aghion
and Howitt (1998), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993),
Romer (1990), and others, knowledge advance is the driver of eco-
nomic growth, and IPRs protect incentives for continued innovation.
1 It is diﬃcult to think of interesting nonrival economic goods
that are not at the same time aspatial. Emphasizing both features,
however, serves to remind why “increasing returns” is not necessarily
the most useful way to model nonrivalry.
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Second, as more and more everyday economic activity becomes
the creating and disseminating of knowledge products, the associ-
ated incentive mechanisms become correspondingly more important.
These can no longer be relegated to historically- and haphazardly-
determined patent and copyright law.
Take, as just one example, Microsoft Corp.: If this company
and its actions are as central to the modern economy’s operation as
both plaintiﬀ and defendant in high-proﬁle antitrust suits through the
1990s have made them out to be, then certainly the economics sur-
rounding Linux and the Open Source Software movement matters im-
portantly. And that economics is, in essence, that of the creation and
dissemination of knowledge products. So too, over the same period,
is the concern over ownership of knowledge on the human genome,
provision of pharmaceuticals cheaply to developing economies, and
proliferation of music on the Internet, among others. Internet devel-
opment then, at its observed rapid rate of technical progress, ampliﬁes
the importance of appropriate institutions for managing IPRs.
Third, the aspatial nature of knowledge products creates power-
ful forces that will redraw the economic landscape across realworld
geographies. Economic analyses and policy formulations that rely on
the sanctity of national boundaries or on transportation costs across
physical distance will, a priori, need to be re-examined. (See, e.g.,
Quah (2000, 2001a, 2002b).)
The issues raised by these developments are large and complex,
and are not usefully treated in a single article. This paper, instead,
analyzes only certain aspects of economic equilibrium for knowledge
products. It focuses on the so-called Arrow-Nordhaus “problem of
capture” (Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1969). When an asset has zero
marginal costs of reproduction, the stream of rents it commands un-
der perfect competition is also zero. But if so then a costly ﬁrst in-
stantiation will never occur, even if social eﬃciency dictates it should.
This market failure has led to the establishment, economic analysis,
and policy debate over, among other things, the protection of intel-
lectual property rights.
Optimal IP schemes, again, have many diﬀerent aspects to them,
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A
F (K,H ×A) U(C,A)
Fig. 1: Intellectual assets A in production and in consump-
tion The left arm in the Figure points to ﬁrms’ production functions
F ; the right, consumers’ utility U Although potentially diﬀerent A’s
enter production and consumption, they all share the same essential
economic properties. In F , physical and human capital are K and H;
in U , other consumption goods are C.
far too many to describe even just brieﬂy.2 However, almost all such
work takes the view that intellectual assets matter primarily for pro-
duction. Innovation and creativity expand the set of intellectual as-
sets, in turn shifting out an economy’s production function.
Cultural goods, by contrast, are intellectual assets that pretend to
do no such thing. Their consumption might enrich a consumer’s well-
being, but it is only at a signiﬁcant stretch that anyone would argue
that that impact later manifests in higher productivity. Admittedly
not all cultural goods are nonrival, aspatial, and initially discrete (live
performance events are obviously rival and very spatially-localized).
But many are. A convenient and integrated depiction of those, to-
gether with traditional science-based intellectual assets, might be as
in Fig. 1.
Without taking a prejudiced stance on whether science on the
left is prior to or superior over culture and the arts on the right, it is
useful to use a neutral language. Quah (2001b, 2002c) has called the
representation in Fig. 1 a weightless economy. Thus, a Britney Spears
MP3 track belongs on the right side of the Figure. Although some
might dispute even that, but pretty much everyone would exclude
2 See among many others Dasgupta (1988), Dasgupta and Maskin
(1987), David (1992, 1993), Keely (2001), Klemperer (1990), Scotch-
mer (1991, 1995), Wright (1983), and Waterson (1990).
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it from the left. Regardless, however, economic analysis of such a
cultural good on the right should be identical with that for, say, a
Human Genome Project discovery on the left—both are nonrival,
aspatial, and initially discrete. Scientiﬁc discoveries and engineering
blueprints belong on the left. Videogames, movies, music, and media
images of aesthetic value go on the right. Depending on the consumer,
computer software might appear on both sides.
The traditional analyis of assets like A admits upfront that their
nonrivalry drives price to zero and thus causes competitive markets
to fail. But wrapping IP protection around such assets overturns
the zero-price conclusion and potentially gives a stream of positive
monopoly rents to their initiator. Markets, although subsequently
imperfect, can then function. Artists and scientists on right and left
sides of Fig. 1 can now aﬀord to be innovative and to see economic
reward accrue to their creativity.
Some observers think that because, in this scheme of IP protec-
tion, property rights have been assigned and markets now determine
allocations, IPRs must lead to optimal outcomes (if only in some
ill-deﬁned Coaseian way). In theory and in practice, this stylized
proposition fails in almost every reasonable circumstance. Intellec-
tual property rights diﬀer profoundly from ordinary property rights.
Consider, for example, IPRs surrounding shrinkwrapped com-
puter software. How would these look applied to automobiles? If,
the ﬁrst weekend after purchase, the consumer drives her children to
visit their grandparents and the car breaks down on the highway, the
manufacturer accepts no responsibility. The consumer is not allowed
to open up the hood and ﬁx the car if anything breaks down with
it—or even just to improve the car’s performance for her own beneﬁt.
If she wants to park the car at work, she’ll have to purchase a new
one altogether—the old one is, legally, permitted parking only at her
residence. Finally, although she has spent several hundred times the
marginal cost of the car in the purchase, ownership remains with the
automobile manufacturer.3
3 Comparing software to physical goods is rhetoric with a long
tradition in the software community. For me, one of the most resonant
–6–
Market-driven creativity
Ordinary property rights in an Arrow-Debreu environment rule
out expropriation and theft. True, intellectual property rights do as
well. But ordinary property rights allow complete transfer of the
asset at market prices—after which the original owner has no further
say in how the assets are used. Intellectual property rights don’t.
Ordinary property rights allow price-taking behavior and competitive
equilibrium. Intellectual property rights don’t.
Discussion of the Arrow-Nordhaus problem often takes place in
partial equilibrium, with a given static market demand curve on one
side and a monopolistic ﬁrm on the other. The tradeoﬀ depicted is
between the loss in consumer welfare from the ﬁrm restricting supply
versus the gain in proﬁts from the ﬁrm behaving monopolistically.
Sometimes, optimal policy on intellectual assets is characterized by
maximizing the present value of the sum of consumer welfare and
monopoly proﬁts—see, e.g., Nordhaus (1969), Scherer (1972), and
Tirole (1989, Ex. 10.4, pp. 392, 416).
To anticipate some of the discussion below, in dynamic general
equilibrium, the ﬁrm’s actions can potentially have implications over
time, while whatever monopoly rents it generates ultimately get dis-
tributed to its shareholders, i.e., to consumers. The traditional for-
mulation described above might, therefore, give only an incomplete
and misleading picture. This section re-formulates the problem in a
representative-agent, dynamic general equilibrium model. Although
necessarily diﬀerent in parts, the formulation that follows is close in
spirit to Boldrin and Levine (2002) and Quah (2002a). We will see
that some insights from the partial equilibrium analysis carry over,
not all, and the welfare calculations on optimal IPR protection be-
come more nuanced.
In the analysis below maximizing the present value of the sum of
consumer welfare and monopoly proﬁts is almost never the right pol-
icy. For one, if the intellectual asset already exists it must be socially
optimal to disseminate it as widely as possible. The socially optimal
policy ex post is to have no IP protection. Ex ante, on the other
descriptions appears in Stephenson (1999, pp. 4–8), who looks at
operating systems as sports cars and space-age military tanks.
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hand, if the intellectual asset does not yet exist, what determines
its instantiation is only whether its post-creation market price dom-
inates its cost of creation. For a given intellectual asset, therefore,
socially optimal policy sets IP protection to maximize the gain in
consumer welfare subject to the constraint that the intellectual asset
gets instantiated. Looking across all possible intellectual assets, the
marginal asset that should be instantiated is that for which the gain
in consumer welfare is zero at that level of IP protection where the
asset just gets created. Initial discreteness matters importantly here,
for otherwise, markets will create smaller and smaller instantiation
quantities, not instead sharply distinguish intellectual assets that are
instantiated from those that are not.
3 The model
3.1 Commodity space
A consumption bundle c is a nonnegative doubly-indexed array of
numbers
c = { cmt ∈ R+ : m = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; t = 0, 1, 2, . . . } ,
where m indexes goods and t indexes discrete time. The commodity
space C is the collection of all consumption bundles c.
Each cmt is the ﬂow of consumption services generated from an
associated durable asset stock smt through a technology described in
section 3.3 below. While sm’s are durable, consumption services cm’s
are not. Apart from asset m = 0 which exists in positive quantity for
all time, not all assets m need be available at time 0. Instead, at time
0, the ﬁrst instance of asset m ≥ 1 will be costly to create. Should
instantiation occur for m, the ﬁnite positive amount s†m ∈ (0,∞) is
produced.
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3.2 Consumers
The inﬁnitely-lived representative agent has preferences at time 0
deﬁned on C:
∀c ∈ C : U(c) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[ ∞∑
m=0
Um(cmt)
]
, β in (0, 1). (1)
Discounting is geometric at rate given by discount factor β. Prefer-
ences show additive separability across goods and time.
Utility function Um, for each m, is increasing, concave, twice-
continuously diﬀerentiable, bounded, and has U ′m(c) → ∞ as c → 0.
For each Um the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
σm(cm)
def=
U ′m(cm)
−cm × U ′′m(cm)
> 0. (2)
(The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in a stochastic model is σ−1m .)
It will be convenient (although not strictly necessary) to assume
the following.
Condition S For all m = 1, 2, 3, . . . , the unit elasticity point
c(1)m
def= { cm ∈ R+ : σm(cm) = 1 }
exists, is unique, and satisﬁes
0 < c(1)m < s
†
m <∞
(recalling that s†m is the instantiation quantity for asset m).
Condition S rules out constant CRRA utility functions, i.e., where
Um(cm) = (1− σ−1)−1[c1−σ−1m − 1], with c(1)m then either nonexistent
or the entire space R+. While excluding such preferences might seem
overly restrictive, they can be accommodated by allowing optimal
supply decisions at either 0 or the boundary implied by sm, at the
expense of arduously accounting for numerous special cases in the
discussion to follow. Moreover, proﬁts can then be inﬁnite even with
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quantity cm supplied equal to 0—a pathology due to constant elas-
ticity. Condition S, in contrast, allows interior optima and so greatly
facilitates discussion.
Additive separability across goods m in preferences (1) is a strong
restriction but it permits clear and explicit statement of results. Some
of the conclusions that follow are easily amended if additive separa-
bility is not assumed—the changes necessary are not at all surprising
nor novel. For the purposes of this paper, the ﬁrst-order problems
are those most usefully treated with this restriction on preferences.
Finally, the representative consumer receives exogenous labor in-
come yt each period t.
3.3 Technology
Each good m is associated with a durable asset sm. The m = 0 asset
follows a storage technology, growing at gross rate R ∈ [1, β−1). Let
the stock s0 be the same good as labor income y so that its economy-
wide evolution follows:
s0,t+1 = R× s0t + yt − c0t (3)
(remembering the consumer is representative). Because of constant
returns to scale the ownership pattern of s0 is irrelevant for equilib-
rium. Assume, for simplicity, that the consumer holds s0 and person-
ally operates storage technology (3).
Form ≥ 1 consumption ﬂows are produced oﬀ stocks sm according
to cmt ∈ [0, smt] each period. However, unlike m = 0, assets m ≥ 1
are nonrival. Once sm0 = s
†
m > 0 exists and is revealed, if unchecked,
knowledge of how to produce sm propagates instantaneously so that,
immediately, the (possibly inﬁnite) quantity sm  s†m becomes avail-
able, freely, to society.
This assumption is extreme but no substantive results change if it
is altered so that, say, post-revelation marginal costs remain positive
but are smaller than pre-revelation marginal costs. The calculations
that follow just become more elaborate with no added conceptual
beneﬁt.
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In the model the instantiation quantity s† could well be taken to
equal s, since equilibrium will have either c < s† or c = s—the value
of s† never explicitly appears in any calculation. But it is useful to
retain s† for ease of discussion and interpretation—and it forms a
conceptual bridge from the model here to those in two closely-related
papers, Boldrin and Levine (2002) and Quah (2002a).
The assumption that post-revelation s is arbitrarily large is some-
times known as inﬁnite expansibility. Here, nonrivalry and inﬁnite ex-
pansibility are used interchangeably. Quah (2002a) argues it is useful
to distinguish the two—see also section 5 below.
Because of the additive separability in preferences (1) and the
independent technology across m, the model evades issues of breadth
and cumulation in creativity (Klemperer, 1990; Scotchmer, 1991).
In return, however, the welfare analysis in sections 3.4 and 4 below
becomes particularly transparent.
3.4 Social eﬃciency
Conditional on M the set of assets m extant at time 0, social eﬃciency
calls for ﬂooding the market in goods m ≥ 1, i.e., for all m ∈ M \ 0,
reveal sm and then set consumption to the maximum technologically
feasible amount, cmt = sm.
To determine in command optimum the socially eﬃcient set of
assets, denote for each m ≥ 1 the one-time cost of instantiation by
ψm ≥ 0. The welfare gain after instantiation relative to before is:
Gm(0) =
∞∑
t=0
βt [Um(sm)− Um(0)] .
(The 0 argument to G appears for a reason—this notation will be
used again in section 4 below.) Then the command optimum socially
eﬃcient MCm has:
MCm \ 0 = arg sup
{m≥1 }
∑
m
[Gm(0) − ψm] ,
so thatm ∈ MCm\0 if and only if Gm(0) ≥ ψm. The marginal intellec-
tual asset that should be instantiated equates the two, Gm(0) = ψm.
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Notice that the margin of optimization here is the discrete asset m,
not the continuously-variable quantity s, which instead is held ﬁxed
at s†. This ﬁxity of instantiation quantity captures the initial dis-
creteness described earlier in section 2.
We will return to social eﬃciency in section 4 below, to compare
with allocations achievable under IPR systems. It is these latter,
however, that we next consider.
3.5 Intellectual Property Rights and Firms
For m ≥ 1 a ﬁrm m is the operator of asset sm. Consumers own
shares in the ﬁrm and receive all the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Once ﬁrm m
has acquired the initial instantiated quantity s†m, operating costs are
zero so that the ﬁrm’s entire revenue ﬂow is proﬁt and distributed as
dividends to its shareholders.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (IPR) At time 0 an IP protection duration for
asset m is a non-negative integer Tm, possibly inﬁnite, such that for
periods 0 through Tm − 1 the owner of asset m is awarded exclusive
rights over its use. Write M for the set of all m’s already instanti-
ated at time 0 and let TM list the associated IP protection durations
{Tm : m ∈ M }. At time 0 an IPR regime is the pair (M,TM).
When an asset attracts IP protection, from period 0 through Tm−
1, the ﬁrm behaves as a monopolist, and sells consumption service
ﬂows cm at price pm. Because what it sells to consumers in service
ﬂows cm is nondurable, the ﬁrm does not face the usual Coase problem
of durable goods monopoly. From condition S, we will see below (in
the proof of Prop. 3.3) that while the ﬁrm can, it maintains asset
stock at the instantiation quantity:
smt = s†m, for 0 ≤ t < Tm.
Assume this, therefore, without loss of generality. At time Tm the
IPR expires and the legally-sanctioned monopoly ends, whereupon
smt = sm and pmt = 0 for all t ≥ Tm.
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For m ≥ 1 denote the price of asset m at time t by qmt. The
value of ﬁrm m is then qmt × smt. Conditional on sm0 > 0, ﬁrm
m maximizes value, selling nondurable consumption services cmt at
price pmt, so that:
qmtsmt =
∞∑
j=0
pm,t+jcm,t+j .
Value maximization yields for the ﬁrm a ﬂow of revenue, proﬁts, and
dividends per asset unit all equal to dmt = (pmt × cmt)s−1mt. These
are distributed to the ﬁrms’ shareholders. However, once outside
IP protection, since the asset’s consumption service ﬂows have price
pmt = 0 so too the ﬁrm’s revenues dmt equal 0.
Asset m = 0 diﬀers from all others. For consistent notation write
p0t = 1 and q0t = 1 as the period t consumption and asset prices
corresponding to good 0 and deﬁne for all t ≥ 0:
d0t
def= R− 1 ≥ 0 =⇒ q0,t+1 + d0,t+1
q0t
= R. (4)
Recall that asset 0 always exists and follows (3). Thus, every IPR
regime (M,TM) has 0 ∈ M and T0 = ∞. The collection of nonrival
assets already instantiated is then M \ 0.
3.6 Market Equilibrium with IPRs
For this section assume that at time 0 all m in a set M have been
instantiated and that IPR regime (M,TM) is in place.
The representative consumer holds shares in and collects divi-
dends from ﬁrms (section 3.5 below), and has exogenous labor income
{ yt : t ≥ 0 }, the same good as c0t. There is, by convention, one share
per unit of productive capital s.
The consumer maximizes utility (1), choosing consumption cmt
and asset holdings sm,t+1, taking as given x0, deﬁned to be the col-
lection of initial asset holdings {sm0, m ∈ M}, consumption prices
pmt, asset prices qmt, dividends dmt, and labor incomes yt (all t ≥ 0).
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The consumer’s period t budget constraint is:
∑
m∈M
qmtsm,t+1 +
∑
m∈M
pmtcmt ≤ yt +
∑
m∈M
(qmt + dmt)smt. (5)
Upon expiration of IP protection when t ≥ Tm, the consumer sees
price pmt, dividend ﬂow dmt, and asset value qmt all equalling zero.
Eventually, therefore, budget constraint (5) becomes just
q0ts0,t+1 + p0tc0t ≤ yt + (q0t + d0t) s0t.
Upon IPR expiration, consumption service ﬂow cmt is freely provided
in quantity sm at zero price. Thus, the consumer need select only cmt
and sm,t+1 for t < Tm. Write the consumer’s decision rules as
cmt = cmt(x0)
sm,t+1 = sm,t+1(x0), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tm − 1.
(6)
Recall the consumer owns the storage technology for m = 0. For
m ≥ 1 the ﬁrm’s value at time 0 is
qm0sm0 =
∞∑
t=0
pmtcmt =
Tm−1∑
t=0
pmtcmt. (7)
Under the assumed IPR regime, ﬁrm m ≥ 1 behaves monopolistically
for t = 0, 1, . . . , Tm − 1. For that time the ﬁrm maximizes (7) taking
as given the consumer’s decision rules (6).
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Equilibrium with IPRs) Suppose at time 0 the
set M is the collection of m already instantiated, and IPR regime
(M,TM) is in place. An equilibrium under (M,TM) is a collection
of prices and quantities
{
p∗mt, q
∗
mt, c
∗
mt, s
∗
m,t+1 : t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tm − 1; m ∈ M
}
such that for each m ∈ M \ 0:
(i) the pair (p∗m, c∗m) maximizes the ﬁrm’s value (7) subject to the
consumer’s decision rules (6);
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(ii) the product q∗mts∗mt equals the ﬁrm’s optimized value (7); and
(iii) with x0 evaluated at (p∗, q∗), the consumer’s decision rules (6)
give s∗m,t+1 = s
†
m.
A stronger IPR regime, in the sense of higher Tm, allows more ex-
tended monopoly operation, therefore increasing the value of the ﬁrm.
At the same time, however, monopolistic behavior restricts consump-
tion and therefore reduces consumer welfare. This is familiar and
reasonable from partial equilibrium analysis. But in the current dy-
namic general equilibrium model, the ﬁrm distributes monopoly rents
back to its owner, who in turn is also the forward-looking represen-
tative consumer. Nevertheless, the intuition regarding tradeoﬀs on
IPR’s remains. The following formalizes this.
Proposition 3.3 Assume condition S. Suppose at time 0 the set M
comprises all m’s already instantiated and IPR regime (M,TM) is in
place. Fix n ∈ M \ 0 and write T = Tn. In Defn. 3.2 equilibrium the
monopoly in n sets for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1,
c∗nt = c
(1)
n
p∗nt = (Rβ)
t × U
′
n(c
(1)
n )
U ′0(c00)
= (Rβ)t × p∗n0,
so that its value is then
Vn(T ) = q∗n0s†n =
U ′n(c
(1)
n )
U ′0(c00)
c(1)n ×
1− (Rβ)T
1−Rβ .
The gain in consumer welfare over when asset n does not exist is
Gn(T ) = (1− β)−1
{[
Un(c(1)n )− Un(0)
]
+
[
Un(sn)− Un(c(1)n )
]× βT
}
.
(All proofs are in the Technical Appendix.)
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The proof of Prop. 3.3 establishes that equilibrium prices satisfy
p∗mt = (Rβ)
t × U
′
m(c
(1)
m )
U ′0(c00)
= (Rβ)t × p∗m0,
so that the monopoly value in Prop. 3.3 can also be written
Vn(T ) = q∗n0s†n = p∗n0c(1)n ×
1− (Rβ)T
1−Rβ .
Since for m ∈ M \ 0 we have dmt = pmtcmt in general equilibrium,
no wealth eﬀects arise when adjusting IP duration T or even when
shutting down n altogether. The welfare implications are therefore
direct and transparent.
Monopoly value V increases in T . The longer ﬁrm n is allowed its
monopolistic advantage, the more someone is willing to pay upfront
for its intellectual asset s†n. By contrast, the gain in consumer welfare
G declines in T . The longer ﬁrm n operates as a monopoly, the longer
is supply restricted and thus the more the consumer loses in consumer
surplus. In the expression for G in Prop. 3.3, if T = 0 the right side has
the term in braces equal to just Un(sn)− Un(0), i.e., the period gain
in utility from n existing and disseminated as widely as possible, over
when n does not exist. The greater is T , the longer is the consumer
restricted to gaining only the smaller quantity Un(c
(1)
n )−Un(0) under
IP protection.
4 Asset creation and optimal IPR regimes
This section considers determination of the set M and analyzes wel-
fare implications of diﬀerent IPR arrangements. In the representative
agent dynamic general equilibrium model of section 3, welfare calcu-
lations are transparent. Social eﬃciency maximizes welfare of the
representative agent subject to appropriate constraints. Monopoly
proﬁts accrue to a ﬁrm that is only a shell. Proﬁts have no inde-
pendent signiﬁcance for social welfare, beyond how they impact the
representative consumer’s utility in equilibrium.
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All statements in this section except those requiring more ex-
plicit calculation—Prop. 4.1 and condition (13) in Prop. 4.2—apply
generally so long as welfare gain G decreases and monopoly value V
increases in IP duration T .
A ﬁrst general implication is that except in extreme special cases,
optimal Tm must vary across m. No one-size-ﬁts-all policy—a single
setting for Tm = T for all m ∈ M \ 0—can be optimal when Um’s
diﬀer.
Second, when asset n = 0 already exists, social eﬃciency calls
for Tn = 0, i.e., for no IP protection. This maximizes Gn and drives
monopoly value Vn to zero and so maximizes consumer welfare but
with no negative impact in economic performance anywhere. If n
already exists, whatever value Vn takes has no further implication
for incentivizing n’s creation. Setting Tn = 0 might be viewed as
expropriation of an intellectual asset. Doing so, however, is ex post
socially optimal.
Third, and more interesting, suppose asset n does not yet exist
but costs ψn ≥ 0 to instantiate to quantity s†n. If policymakers are,
willfully, determined that n should exist, then social eﬃciency sets
Tn to maximize consumer welfare gain Gn subject to the constraint
that the asset gets instantiated, i.e, that Vn is no smaller than ψn. Of
course, it might be that that is not feasible, i.e., limT→∞ Vn(T ) < ψn
so that no setting for Tn can instantiate n. If, however, that is not
the case, then socially eﬃcient T (n) solves:
T (n)
def= argmax
0≤T≤∞
{Gn(T ) : Vn(T ) ≥ ψn }
= min
T≥0
{T : Vn(T ) ≥ ψn }
(8)
(where the last equation follows from Gn decreasing in its argument).
For the functional form for V given in Prop. 3.3 equation (8) can
be given more concrete expression.
Proposition 4.1 Assume the conditions of Prop. 3.3 and suppose
that
ψn ≤ (1−Rβ)−1 × p∗n0c(1)n .
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Then T (n) in equation (8) is the smallest integer bounded below by
log
(
1− (1−Rβ)
[
p∗n0c
(1)
n
]−1
ψn
)
log(Rβ)
≥ 0.
If ψn > 0 then T (n) ≥ 1.
The upper bound for ψn in the hypotheses of Prop. 4.1 is the
present value of an inﬁnitely-lived monopoly. If ψn exceeds this, then
asset n is too costly to be created willingly in IPR-based markets
alone. Duration T (n) depends on R, ψn, β, and preferences through
equilibrium prices p∗n0. Up to the bound given in the proposition,
higher ψn increases the required IP duration T (n). Assets that are
expensive to instantiate require stronger IP protection.
Fourth, suppose no m ≥ 1 yet exists and social policy is looking
across assets to instantiate into M\0. The marginal m should be that
where consumer welfare gain Gm(Tm) is non-negative at the minimum
Tm such that Vm(Tm) is no smaller than ψm. Put diﬀerently, the
marginal m to be created must not reduce consumer welfare from its
requiring an overly high setting in IP duration for its instantiation.
Formally, from T (m) in (8), market-based social eﬃciency using IPRs
has
M \ 0 = MIP def=
{
m ≥ 1 : Gm(T (m)) ≥ 0
}
. (9)
Under optimal IPR regimes, only those assets where costs and utili-
ties align so that Gm(T (m)) ≥ 0 should be created for social eﬃciency.
Moreover, by construction, it is precisely those assets that are will-
ingly created by markets operating under the optimal IPR regime.
Equations (8) and (9) therefore provide a compact description of
socially eﬃcient innovation in a market economy with IPRs. Equation
(8) characterizes the ex ante incentive for innovating and thereby cre-
ating an intellectual asset; equation (9) describes the ex post impact
on social eﬃciency. Together, they trace out, in general equilibrium,
the tension between ex ante and ex post economic considerations
characterizing innovation and creativity.
–18–
Market-driven creativity
The conditions for MIP in (8)–(9) imply, for any pm > 0, that
Gm(T (m)) + Vm(T (m)) ≥ ψm. (10)
Condition (10), however, does not by itself give MIP. For instance,
we can have the sum Gm + Vm exceeding ψm while, at the same
time, ψm strictly exceeds Vm everywhere, so that m /∈ MIP and m’s
instantiation would not be implementable using IPRs and markets.
Unless transfers occur from consumers to ﬁrms, condition (10) is only
necessary but not suﬃcient for m ∈ MIP.
Two possible additional notions for socially eﬃcient innovation
suggest themselves here. First is to extrapolate from the traditional
partial equilibrium analysis and to consider socially eﬃcient assets as
the set MΣ of m’s satisfying (10), i.e.,
MΣ
def=
{
m ≥ 1 : Gm(T (m)) + Vm(T (m))− ψm ≥ 0
}
. (11)
By the previous reasoning, we have MΣ ⊇ MIP, so that markets with
optimal IP protection within the IPR regime achieve less than the
socially eﬃcient amount of creativity, according to this deﬁnition.
The second possibility is to consider a command optimum that
instantiates all m ≥ 1 such that
Gm(0) ≥ ψm, (12)
as discussed earlier in section 3.4. Here, the ﬁrm is just a veil and
thus has any value associated with it summarily ignored, while IP
protection is set to zero to maximize the gain in consumer welfare.
Since no markets in m ≥ 1 function, criterion (12) uses the period 0
ratio of marginal utilities to convert across good m and numeraire 0.
Collect those assets instantiated by (12) into the set
MCm
def= {m ≥ 1 : Gm(0)− ψm ≥ 0 } .
While MΣ ⊇ MIP the same relation need not always hold for MCm.
Therefore, the IPR market-based socially eﬃcient outcome might pro-
vide more or less creative activity than the command optimum. To
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see this, notice that MIP depends, through V, on the storage rate R
and marginal utilities U ′m, while MCm does not. The relation between
innovation under an IPR markets-based outcome and the command
optimum therefore varies with sm, c
(1)
m , and R, among other quanti-
ties.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that for all m ∈ MIP, the solution to (8)
exists (although possibly inﬁnite), and that
[
Um(sm)− Um(c(1)m )
]× U ′0(c00)
U ′m(c
(1)
m ) c
(1)
m
≥
∑T (m)−1
t=0 (Rβ)
t
∑T (m)−1
t=0 β
t
. (13)
Then MCm ⊇ MΣ ⊇ MIP.
If the utility gain [Um(sm)− Um(c(1)m )] normalized by
U ′m(c
(1)
m ) c
(1)
m /U
′
0(c00) = p
∗
m0c
(1)
m
is suﬃciently large, so that condition (13) is satisﬁed, then the com-
mand optimum always has more creativity and innovation than achie-
veable using optimal IPRs. In informal discussion, the post-revelation
Um(sm) is often taken arbitrarily large, thereby delivering (13) when-
ever pre-revelation price is positive.
When the conclusion of Prop. 4.2 holds, then MCm ⊃ MIP so that
IPRs and markets provide too little innovation relative to the com-
mand optimum. However, ineﬃciently low innovation is not the only
possible outcome. Inequality (13) can easily be reversed whereupon
too much creative activity possibly (not necessarily) occurs with IPRs
and markets. This is more likely the higher is the storage rate R, the
stronger is optimal IP protection (through high T (m)), the higher is
equilibrium monopoly revenue p∗m0c
(1)
m , and the lower is the welfare
gain from freeing intellectual assets [Um(sm)−Um(c(1)m )]. Notice that
these eﬀects diﬀer from the negative externalities earlier identiﬁed
in models of creative destruction and patent races—see, e.g., Aghion
and Howitt (1998), Dasgupta (1988), or Jones and Williams (2000).
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Finally, to complete the discussion, we can ask: Under what cir-
cumstances would maximizing the present value of the sum of con-
sumer welfare gain and monopoly proﬁts recover socially eﬃcient pol-
icy? Fix an asset m ≥ 1 and deﬁne the ad hoc welfare function
Wm(T ) = ω × Gm(T ) + Vm(T ), ω ∈ R+, (14)
where ω is a non-negative weight. In equation (8) we can calculate
T (m) by constrained maximization, with the associated Lagrangean
L(T, λ) def= Gm(T )− λ [ψm − Vm(T )] .
For simplicity assume that we can vary T continuously rather than
being restricted to integer T . Then T (m) = V−1m (ψm) solves the ad
hoc welfare optimization problem using (14) only if weight ω is chosen
as
ω = λ−1 = −V
′
m(T (m))
G′m(T (m))
> 0.
It seems unlikely that an a priori, ad hoc speciﬁcation for function
(14) should set ω to precisely this value.
5 Markets without IPRs
From the technology speciﬁed in section 3.3 no ﬁrm sees positive value
for itself in competitive equilibrium without IP protection, i.e., with
T = 0. This happens because of nonrivalry—once the asset exists,
everyone else can use it without degrading its usefulness to anyone
else. Thus, in competitive markets equilibrium price gets driven to
marginal costs of zero, and therefore the present value of revenues is
also zero.
Boldrin and Levine (2002) have observed that this view is ex-
treme. More realistic is to assume that intellectual assets are only
nearly nonrival. By this Boldrin and Levine (2002) mean that assets
physically cannot be instantaneously reproduced inﬁnitely—unlike
the post-revelation phase described in section 3.3 above. Boldrin and
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Levine (2002) prove that with this slight change perfectly competi-
tive Arrow-Debreu markets function optimally and IPRs are either
unnecessary or, if they aﬀect allocations, harmful to social eﬃciency.
Creativity and innovation are properly priced in competitive equilib-
rium, and socially eﬃcient outcomes obtain without the contrivance
of IPRs.
A remarkable feature of equilibrium in the Boldrin-Levine model
is that even as the rate of reproduction increases without bound—
as the technology in their model approaches the extreme in section
3.3—perfectly competitive markets continue to function optimally.
Thus, in their analysis, the extreme technology of section 3.3 implies
predictions that are fragile, whereas competitive markets robustly
allocate resources optimally in all neighborhoods of that extreme.
Quah (2002a) has suggested that it is useful to distinguish in-
tellectual assets that are nonrival—in the sense described in section
1—from assets that are inﬁnitely expansible, a term introduced by
David (1992). It is then only near inﬁnite-expansibility or, better, ﬁ-
nite expansibility that is analyzed in Boldrin and Levine (2002). Quah
(2002a) shows how intellectual assets that are nonrival but ﬁnitely ex-
pansible can be supported in Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium.
The optimal allocation then sets dissemination of intellectual assets
to be totally unrestricted except by technological constraints. Quah
(2002a) shows how such an outcome diﬀers from that resulting from
the speciﬁcation in Boldrin and Levine (2002). He argues that such a
scheme can be used to interpret the Open Source Software movement.
6 Conclusions
This paper has described how a subclass of cultural goods and sci-
ence and technology have common economic properties. Economic
analysis of intellectual property protection in science can, therefore,
usefully be applied to understand the same in culture.
From the traditional economics of science and technology, mar-
ket failure is endemic. Societies tolerate monopolistic ineﬃciency in
intellectual property protection to incentivize the creation and distri-
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bution of intellectual assets. This paper has analyzed that tradeoﬀ
in dynamic, representative agent general equilibrium. It has charac-
terized socially eﬃcient creativity and shown how IPR-based markets
can produce more or less innovation than optimal.
Partial equilibrium analysis of these questions has often described
eﬃciency by optimizing the (PDV) sum of consumer welfare and
monopoly proﬁts. Relative to the dynamic general model equilib-
rium model in this paper, there are at least three reasons why that
is misleading. First, summing consumer welfare and monopoly prof-
its ignores general equilibrium considerations—monopoly proﬁts are,
ultimately, distributed to shareholders who are in turn again con-
sumers. In general equilibrium, proﬁts (and ﬁrms) are merely a veil,
and give no independent contribution to economic welfare. Second,
the sum of consumer surplus and monopoly proﬁts cannot describe
implementation using markets alone, without some form of trans-
fers from consumers to ﬁrms. Third, only by accident would allo-
cations obtained by maximizing the sum of consumer welfare and
monopoly proﬁts give social eﬃciency; conversely, socially eﬃcient
innovations don’t, in general, maximize the sum of consumer welfare
and monopoly proﬁts. Additionally, in a fully-speciﬁed model, con-
sumers too are forward-looking—not just ﬁrms—and that inﬂuences
monopoly operations, even when that monopoly sells to consumers
only nondurables [so that Coase-conjecture analysis is irrelevant].
This paper’s model had additive separability and independence
across intellectual assets—no intellectual contribution builds on any
other, and no intellectual asset depends on any other. There is thus
neither breadth (Klemperer, 1990) nor cumulation (Scotchmer, 1991).
Thus, a number of interesting eﬀects cannot be examined in this
paper’s framework. Nevertheless, however, the paper has provided
what, seems to me, is a clean and transparent dynamic general equi-
librium welfare analysis of the Arrow-Nordhaus “problem of capture”.
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7 Technical Appendix
This section holds all proofs to results in the paper.
Proof of Prop. 3.3 At time 0 the consumer’s problem has La-
grangean
Lc =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(∑
m∈M
Um(cmt)
)
− λt
[∑
m∈M
qmtsm,t+1 +
∑
m∈M
pmtcmt
−yt −
∑
m∈M
(qmt + dmt)smt
]}
.
Recall that for m ∈ M \ 0 the consumer needs to decide (cmt, sm,t+1)
only from t = 0 to Tm− 1. Set T0 =∞. First-order conditions for all
m ∈ M then are:
U ′m(cmt)− λtpmt ≤ 0
−λtqmt + βλt+1 [qm,t+1 + dm,t+1] ≤ 0, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tm − 1,
with equality when the corresponding decision variable is interior.
By U ′m(c) → ∞ for c → 0, the ﬁrst-order condition for cm is always
satisﬁed with equality. At t = Tm − 1 the ﬁrst-order condition for
sm,t+1 becomes the inequality λtsmt ≥ 0 since qm,t+1 = dm,t+1 = 0.
Until then, however, for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tm − 2,
λtqmt = βλt+1 [qm,t+1 + dm,t+1] .
From deﬁnition (4) the m = 0 version of this gives
λt = (Rβ)λt+1 =⇒ λt = (Rβ)−tλ0.
Therefore the consumer’s decision rules (6) satisfy
p−1mtU
′
m(cmt) = (Rβ)
−tp−1m0U
′
m(cm0) = (Rβ)
−tU ′0(c00). (15)
Provided that
∀m ∈ M : (qm,t+1 + dm,t+1) q−1mt = λt(βλt+1)−1 = R, (16)
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the consumer willing holds any quantity of durable assets sm. Firm
m ∈ M \ 0 maximizes (7) subject to (15), with Lagrangean
Lm =
Tm−1∑
t=0
pmtcmt − µt
[
(Rβ)−tU ′0(c00)pmt − U ′m(cmt)
]
for some sequence {µt : t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tm − 1 } of Lagrange multipli-
ers. The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions include
cmt − (Rβ)−tU ′0(c00)µt = 0 (17)
pmt + U ′′m(cmt)µt = 0. (18)
Substituting p−1mtU ′m(cmt) = (Rβ)−tU ′0(c00) from constraint (15) into
(17) and using the implied expression for µt in (18) gives
pmt =
−cmtU ′′m(cmt)
U ′m(cmt)
× pmt = σm(cmt)−1pmt =⇒ σm(cmt) = 1,
or c∗mt = c
(1)
m for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tm − 1. The corresponding consump-
tion price sequence is
p∗mt = (Rβ)
t × U
′
m(c
(1)
m )
U ′0(c00)
= (Rβ)t × p∗m0.
Condition S implies c∗mt = c(1)m ∈ (0, s†m) so that the ﬁrm ﬁnds it
optimal to maintain s∗mt = s
†
m. The value of monopoly n at time 0 is
then
q∗n0s
†
n =
T−1∑
t=0
p∗ntc
∗
nt =
U ′n(c
(1)
n )
U ′0(c00)
c(1)n
T−1∑
t=0
(Rβ)t
=
U ′n(c
(1)
n )
U ′0(c00)
c(1)n ×
1− (Rβ)T
1−Rβ .
To calculate the consumer’s welfare gain notice that for n ∈ M \ 0
dividends dnt = pntcnt so that the consumer experiences no wealth
implications if n is not activated. Shutting down (or activating) n
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aﬀects no other consumption in M \ n. Thus, the consumer’s welfare
gain in Defn. 3.2 equilibrium when n exists over when it does not is
Gn(T ) =
T−1∑
t=0
βt Un(c(1)n ) +
∞∑
t=T
βt Un(cn)−
∞∑
t=0
βt Un(0)
=
1− βT
1− β Un(c
(1)
n ) +
βT
1− βUn(cn)−
1
1− βUn(0)
= (1− β)−1{ [Un(c(1)n )− Un(0)]
+
[
Un(sn)− Un(c(1)n )
]× βT }.
The right side of the ﬁrst line in the equation above gives in its ﬁrst
term utility during IP protection; the second term, utility after the
IPR expires; and the third term, utility without n extant—holding
constant all other consumption. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop. 4.1 Prop. 3.3 gives
Vn(T ) = p∗n0c(1)n ×
1− (Rβ)T
1−Rβ ≥ ψn
⇐⇒ 1− (Rβ)T ≥ (1−Rβ)
[
p∗n0c
(1)
n
]−1
ψn
⇐⇒ (Rβ)T ≤ 1− (1−Rβ)
[
p∗n0c
(1)
n
]−1
ψn
⇐⇒ T ≥
log
(
1− (1−Rβ)
[
p∗n0c
(1)
n
]−1
ψn
)
log(Rβ)
≥ 0
since Rβ < 1. When ψn > 0 the numerator is strictly negative. Again
since Rβ ≤ 1 this gives the ratio of logs above strictly positive, so
that then T (n) ≥ 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop. 4.2 Since
T (m)−1∑
t=0
(Rβ)t =
1− (Rβ)T (m)
1−Rβ and
T (m)−1∑
t=0
βt =
1− βT (m)
1− β ,
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condition (13) is
[
Um(sm)− Um(c(1)m )
]× 1− βT
(m)
1− β ≥
U ′m(c
(1)
m )c
(1)
m
U ′0(c00)
× 1− (Rβ)
T (m)
1−Rβ .
But using Prop. 3.3 this is just
Gm(0)− Gm(T (m)) ≥ V(T (m))
⇐⇒ Gm(0) − ψm ≥ Gm(T (m)) + Vm(T (m))− ψm.
If m ∈ MΣ then the right side above is nonnegative implying the
left side is similarly so. But then m ∈ MCm as well. This gives
MCm ⊇ MΣ and, by the reasoning just below equation (11), estab-
lishes MCm ⊇ MΣ ⊇ MIP. Q.E.D.
–30–
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers  
 
        
533 R. Dickens 
A. Manning 
Has the National Minimum Wage Reduced UK Wage 
Inequality? 
 
532 S. Machin 
A. Manning 
 
The Structure of Wages in What Should be a Competitive 
Labour Market 
531 R. Lydon 
A. Chevalier 
 
Estimates of the Effect of Wages on Job Satisfaction 
530 A. Bryson The Union Membership Wage Premium:  An Analysis 
Using Propensity Score Matching 
 
529 H. Gray Family Friendly Working:  What a Performance!  An 
Analysis of the Relationship Between the Availability of 
Family Friendly Policies and Establishment Performance 
 
528 E. Mueller 
A. Spitz 
 
Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance in German 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
527 D. Acemoglu 
J-S. Pischke 
Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training 
   
526 J. Schmitt 
J. Wadsworth 
Give PC’s a Chance:  Personal Computer Ownership and 
the Digital Divide in the United States and Great Britain 
 
525 S. Fernie 
H. Gray 
 
It’s a Family Affair:  the Effect of Union Recognition and 
Human Resource Management on the Provision of Equal 
Opportunities in the UK 
 
524 N. Crafts 
A. J. Venables 
 
Globalization in History:  a Geographical Perspective 
523 E. E. Meade 
D. Nathan Sheets 
 
Regional Influences on US Monetary Policy:  Some 
Implications for Europe 
522 D. Quah Technology Dissemination and Economic Growth:  Some 
Lessons for the New Economy 
 
521 D. Quah Spatial Agglomeration Dynamics 
 
520 C. A. Pissarides Company Start-Up Costs and Employment 
 
519 D. T. Mortensen 
C. A. Pissarides 
 
Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labor Market Outcomes 
518 D. Clark 
R. Fahr 
The Promise of Workplace Training for Non-College 
Bound Youth:  Theory and Evidence from Germany 
 
517 J. Blanden 
A. Goodman 
P. Gregg 
S. Machin 
 
Change in Intergenerational Mobility in Britain 
516 A. Chevalier 
T. K. Viitanen 
The Long-Run Labour Market Consequences of Teenage 
Motherhood in Britain 
 
515 A. Bryson 
R. Gomez 
M. Gunderson 
N. Meltz 
 
Youth Adult Differences in the Demand for Unionisation:  
Are American, British and Canadian Workers That 
Different? 
514 A. Manning Monopsony and the Efficiency of Labor Market 
Interventions 
 
513 H. Steedman Benchmarking Apprenticeship:  UK and Continental 
Europe Compared 
 
512 R. Gomez 
M. Gunderson 
N. Meltz 
 
From ‘Playstations’ to ‘Workstations’:  Youth Preferences 
for Unionisation 
511 G. Duranton 
D. Puga 
 
From Sectoral to Functional Urban Specialisation 
510 P.-P. Combes 
G. Duranton 
 
Labor Pooling, Labour Poaching, and Spatial Clustering 
509 R. Griffith 
S. Redding 
J. Van Reenen 
 
Measuring the Cost Effectiveness of an R&D Tax Credit 
for the UK 
508 H. G. Overman 
S. Redding 
A. J. Venables 
 
The Economic Geography of Trade, Production and 
Income:  A Survey of Empirics 
507 A. J. Venables Geography and International Inequalities:  the Impact of 
New Technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
To order a discussion paper, please contact the Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 
